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Purpose: The paper aims to identify the monitoring effect by financial investors and their 
potential role to mitigate agency costs resulting from concentrated and dispersed ownership.   
Design/Methodology/Approach: Using the sample of 440 companies from the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange listed in 2010-2014, we examine whether financial investors may mitigate the 
agency problems of dispersed and concentrated ownership.  
Findings: We observe that ownership by financial investors is positively correlated with 
company value. Adding to the debate on the monitoring role of financial investors, we note 
that investments by control-oriented institutions and portfolio-oriented investors are 
correlated with higher Tobin’s Q.   
Practical implications: The results indicate the positive effect of the monitoring by financial 
investors, which can offset some limitations of insufficient investor protection in emerging 
markets. 
Originality: The study is based on a unique sample of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange, distinguishing between control-oriented and portfolio-oriented financial 
investors.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Different patterns of ownership structure mirror the map of powers between 
shareholders and explain the process of decision-making in a company. Despite 
several research conducted, authors indicate "the relevance and nuances of the 
ownership structure of the governance of the modern corporation as it exists in the 
global business environment" (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2016). The review of 
existing literature suggests that the mechanisms of how ownership structure is related 
to company performance remain not fully understood, whereas the links between 
ownership concentration and firm value are more complex than expected (Iwasaki 
and Mizobata, 2020).  
 
Firstly, modeling the effects of ownership structure shows how costs and benefits are 
associated with dispersed and concentrated ownership. While ownership 
concentration decreases managerial discretion and improves performance, it reduces 
managerial initiative and may conflict with performance-based incentive schemes. 
Hilli, Laussel, and Long (2013) propose a dispersed ownership model, indicating 
trade-offs between monitoring by the large shareholder and managerial incentives 
and incentives by a significant shareholder to divest. A large shareholder may choose 
different strategies of engaging in corporate governance depending on the size of the 
controlling stakes and the costs associated with interventions (Edmans, 2014). 
Secondly, the prevailing ownership patterns and their effects on company value are 
embedded in the institutional and regulatory context in which a company operates 
(Ducassy and Guyot, 2017), with investor protection playing the essential role. While 
dispersed shareholdings correlate with strong investor protection, ownership 
concentration emerges in weaker institutional environments and civil law traditions. 
When investor's rights are not sufficiently protected, more enormous stakes secure 
their interests.  
 
However, the effects of given ownership characteristics may differ depending on the 
national or regional specificity concerning the values of ownership concentration and 
the type of the majority shareholder. As recent studies suggest, the observed effects 
may be a derivative of the sample characteristics. For instance, studies on highly 
concentrated ownership identified in Belgian companies reveal that "the effect of 
large shareholders is non-monotonic and that there are non-linearities captured by the 
nonparametric estimation" (Hamadi and Heinen, 2015).  
 
This study is designed to examine the effect of the ownership structure in firms listed 
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE), focusing on the monitoring by financial 
investors and their potential role to mitigate agency costs. Agency problems 
associated with dispersed and concentrated ownership are more prevalent in emerging 
markets characterized by insufficient investor protection and low transparency. While 
studies indicate the positive effects of financial investors for governance, there is still 
no theoretical or empirical consensus on the effect of ownership by financial investors 
on company value. Financial investors' term encompasses various institutions that 
tend to exert different investment and governance strategies ranging from activism to 
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passivity. Also, their role may be naturally limited due to the weak ownership position 
versus block-holders in the context of concentrated ownership in emerging markets 
(Berglöf and Claessens, 2006; Hardi and Buti, 2012; Gugler et al., 2014).  
 
The novelty of our paper lies in addressing the effect of ownership on firm value in 
the context of a specific context of a post-socialist, post-transition, emerging 
economy. Specifically, we add to the understanding of financial investors' effect on 
mitigating agency problems in the environment where the role of such investors is 
now rising about investment and contribution to corporate governance. Transition 
reforms initiated the process of capital accumulation – the equity of WSE companies 
controlled by financial investors rose from 16 billion USD in 2002 to 160 billion in 
2017, which corresponds with the growth of the shares stake held from 10% in 2007 
to 32% in 2017 (WSE, 2018).  
 
The paper aims to identify the effects of financial investors on company value in the 
context of an emerging market. Specifically, we test whether ownership by financial 
investors can mitigate the adverse effects of dispersed and concentrated ownership. 
Addressing the argument of agency costs of both dispersed and concentrated 
ownership, which are exacerbated in an emerging market environment, we examine 
the whole population of 440 non-financial companies listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange in the years 2010-2014. We choose the period for two reasons – first, it is 
when companies recovered from the financial crisis, and the institutional investors 
rebuilt their portfolios. In addition, a significant reform carried out in 2014 led to the 
shift of significant funds (ca. 38 bn euro) from pension funds to government-
sponsored schemes changing the balance of fund assets.  Controlling for endogeneity, 
we use the panel model to identify the relationship between Q and shareholder 
structure.  
 
Our results indicate that ownership concentration decreases the firm value. 
Interestingly, the effect of concentrated ownership is more complex than expected. 
Since we note the harmful links between free float and firm value, we argue that, and 
the simple dispersion of ownership is not a solution to principal-principal problems 
as it gives rise to the first type of agency costs. We test whether financial investors 
act as effective monitors in the context of significant ownership concentration and 
insufficient investor protection. We observe that ownership by control-oriented 
investors is correlated with higher Q, while the argument on the positive effect of the 
ownership by portfolio-oriented investors is partially supported.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. We start with the theoretical background and 
hypotheses formulation focusing on the links between ownership and firm value. 
Later, we present the research design referring to the sample construction and 
research methodology and report the results of the regression analysis and robustness 
checks. Finally, we discuss the results referring to the existing literature and conclude 
the paper addressing limitations of our study and implications for further research. 
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2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses  
 
2.1 Agency Problems of Dispersed and Concentrated Ownership  
 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) explores 
conflicts between different shareholders and helps understand how a given ownership 
structure contributes to company performance and firm value. It addresses two types 
of problems – the principal-agent conflict between executives and shareholders and 
the principal-principal conflict between majority and minority shareholders.  
 
The principal-agent conflict occurs in the context of dispersed ownership 
characterized with substantial stakes of free float, defined as the number of shares 
outstanding minus the number of shares that are restricted from trading such as shares 
held by stable investors such as parent company, government, or cross-shareholdings 
among companies (Tolosa and Nicolas, 2018). The free float ratio is the number of 
shares available for public trading. According to agency theory, dispersed ownership 
allows for risk diversification and helps raise a significant amount of capital to grow 
and expand companies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Hilli 
et al., 2013). Dispersed ownership increases liquidity and shifts the monitoring role 
to stock markets where shareholders can quickly signal their disappointment. It is also 
viewed as the manifestation of better investor protection – since investors can rely on 
legal protection and enforcement and trust judicial institutions, they are encouraged 
to acquire an even smaller stake for share as they know their rights are secured. 
 
The limitations of dispersed ownership refer to the problems of coordinating actions 
for numerous and fragmented shareholders and the free riding when these 
shareholders copy large investors in their investment decisions skipping the costly 
review of corporate reporting. Dispersed ownership leads to information asymmetry 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the risk of shareholders' expropriation by managers 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). These problems are exacerbated in emerging markets 
with insufficient investor protection and a weaker institutional environment. Thus, 
we formulate the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Free float is associated with lower company value. 
 
The principal-principal conflict is centered around "counteracting effects on the 
governance of corporations: an incentive effect, which makes monitoring of 
management more efficient" (Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010) and an entrenchment 
effect based on the opportunistically acting owners. The efficient monitoring 
rationale assumes that high cash flow ownership of the largest investors motivates 
them to maximize the company's value by the proper management and effective 
resource allocation (Villalonga and Amit, 2008). Block holders add to the quality of 
governance and increase firm value. Thus, the concentration of ownership assures for 
the alignment of interests since it "can mitigate the traditional agency problem 
between shareholder and managers" as it "provides large investors with both 
sufficient incentive and power to discipline managers, thereby reducing managerial 
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malfeasance and shirking (Wang and Shailer, 2013). Inactive, fragmented investors 
who follow the free-riding strategy, large owners invest significant funds what 
motivates them to incur the governance costs (Maug, 1997). The monitoring potential 
of concentrated ownership is emphasized in emerging markets serving as a 
substitution for a weak institutional environment and insufficient investor protection 
(Berglöf and Claessens, 2006). Considering the weak external mechanisms, block 
holders may provide an additional watchdog function.  
 
Addressing the expropriation plea studies indicate detriments of concentrated 
ownership that reveals the extraction of private benefits by block holders (Edmans, 
2014; Boateng and Huang, 2017) in the form of tunneling or related party 
transactions. Acheson et al. (2016) argue that the company is "charged inflated prices 
and the benefits are earned by the block holder's other firms, at the expense of the 
minority shareholders." In addition, ownership concentration increases the cost of 
capital, reduces the efficiency of risk-bearing, lowers access to external financing, 
portfolio diversification, and the ability to raise funds for the company's development. 
Investments "might face financing constraints as they rely more on controlling 
shareholders' wealth or internally generated cash flow to fund new projects or might 
have to raise funds under less favorable terms because of perceived high risk of 
expropriation by controlling shareholders" (Wang and Shailer, 2013).  
 
Studies on the impact of ownership concentration on firm value do not provide 
conclusive results. Research documents that significant engagement in ownership 
motivates large investors for efficient governance and management (Maug, 1997; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The positive effects of concentrated ownership on firm 
value are noted in emerging and post-transition economies in general (Hardi and Buti, 
2012). However, numerous authors document the negative effect of concentrated 
ownership (Riyanto and Toolsema, 2008) or do not reveal any statistically significant 
relationships (Minguez-Vera and Martin-Ugedo, 2007). Wang and Shailer (2013) 
report result of the meta-analysis on ownership concentration and firm performance 
in emerging markets. Using 419 correlations from 42 primary studies on listed 
companies in 18 emerging markets, they find a negative correlation between 
concentrated ownership and company performance. Thus, we formulate hypothesis 
H2. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Concentrated ownership is associated with lower company value. 
 
2.2 Financial Investors  
 
The coexistence of majority and minority shareholders and the presence of block 
holders have various effects on firm value (Alipour, 2013). Regardless of the control 
pattern, financial investors play an essential role in corporate governance, although 
the prior research findings deliver mixed results. Most studies support the efficient 
monitoring hypothesis and reveal that financial investors contribute to the increase of 
firm value as their superior financial resources and experience combined with access 
to information allow them to monitor the management effectively and thereby 
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mitigate agency problems (Sundaramurthy et al., 2005; Alipour, 2013; Hsu and 
Wang, 2014; Mehrani et al., 2017). Based on their experience, know-how, and 
professional knowledge, financial institutions enhance the oversight and monitoring 
over executives (Nagel et al., 2015) and discipline dominant owners. With active 
shareholder policy, financial investors improve company performance and enhance 
firm value (Rose, 2007; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Krivogorsky and Burton, 
2012).  
 
However, prior research claims that the effect of financial ownership is more complex 
than initially expected. According to the conflict-of-interest hypothesis and strategic 
alignment hypothesis (Shin-Ping and Tsung-Hsien, 2008), financial investors do not 
improve governance and negatively influence firm value. The negative impact of the 
institutional ownership is attributed to their passivity and opportunism linked to the 
fact that they are bound by other business relationships (conflict of interest) or 
cooperate with managers interested in the extraction of private benefits (strategic 
alignment). Since financial investors are not a homogeneous group and may differ in 
their goals, expectations, and, consequently, in their monitoring strategies (Chen et 
al., 2007), institutional shareholders can be divided into two groups according to their 
behavior and objectives regarding business relations with the company – active 
investors and passive investors. Celik and Isaksson (2013) identify four types of 
investors based on the degree of their engagement (no engagement, reactive 
engagement, alpha engagement, inside engagement). Consequently, while 
institutional ownership appears to be positive for firm value, pressure-incentive, 
foreign and large financial investors have a more significant positive effect than 
pressure-sensitive, small, and domestic (Lin and Fu, 2017).   
 
The role played by financial investors is believed to be predominantly driven by the 
size of their holdings (Navissi and Naiker, 2006; Hsu and Wang, 2014; Mehrani et 
al., 2017). By the agency theory, high ownership concentration increases investors’ 
responsibility and sensitivity to market pressure and allows them to internalize most 
of the benefits generated by enhanced monitoring, which stimulates proactive 
behavior (Sundaramurthy et al., 2005). Similarly, minority financial shareholders are 
expected to be myopic and act passively, focusing on short-term profits, which leads 
to value discount. Sahut and Gharbi (2010) argue that the combination of the 
opposing attitudes depending on the size of the stake results in a non-linear 
relationship between institutional ownership and corporate performance. Moreover, 
it should also be noted that as the stake held by financial investors exceeds a certain 
threshold, the entrenchment motives arise (Claessens et al., 2002). With lower 
investments, institutional investors would have limited or no effect on governance 
and value. We distinguish control-oriented investors and portfolio-oriented ones, 
representing the active and passive archetype, and formulate hypotheses H3a and 
H3b.  
  
Hypothesis 3a: Ownership by a control-oriented financial investor is associated with 
higher company value.   
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Hypothesis 3b: Ownership by a portfolio-oriented financial investor has no effect on 
company value.   
 
3. Research Design  
 
3.1 Sample and Data 
 
Our sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 1,965 observations from 440 
companies representing the whole population of firms listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange in 2010-2014. We collect the data on financial performance and firm value 
and the information on the ownership structure from the Emerging Market 
Information System (EMIS) database. The data set lists every shareholder by its 
name, not by its type, so the information on the identity of shareholders was hand 
collected from the National Court Register (Krajowy Rejestr Sądowy, KRS). This 
offers the opportunity to distinguish between specific types of shareholders, such as 




The explained variable is Tobin’s Q which is used in the academic literature as a 
proxy for firm value and assumed future cash flows (Claessens et al., 2002; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2008). To analyze the effect of ownership concentration, we 
follow prior studies (Minguez-Vera and Martin-Ugedo, 2007; Krivogorsky and 
Burton, 2012). We measure ownership using the stake held by different shareholder 
categories, respectively – dispersed ownership by free float, ownership concentration 
by the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders, and financial investors 
by the percentage of shares held by these shareholders. To study the effects of 
financial investors, we divide them into two sub-groups depending on the regulatory 
requirements and investment characteristics (Navissi and Naiker, 
2006). Institutions characterized by significant assets under management, investing 
in numerous equities, possessing stakes below 10% in a single company, and 
operating as investment funds, insurance companies, and pension funds are defined 
as portfolio-oriented financial investors. Those of smaller funds under management, 
investing in one equity at the level of 10% or more, are classified as control-oriented 
financial investors (Celik and Isaksson, 2013). The operationalization of variables 
used in the analysis is presented in Table 1. 
 
We employ the median (not the average) value due to the skewness of Tobin’s Q in 
each subgroup of sample companies distinguished by sector and year of observation. 
The ROA variable is corrected according to the same procedure. As shown in Table 
1, we use firm-level control variables, including the size of assets, EBITDA, the 
binary variable of the operation within a business group, and ownership by the 
second-largest shareholder. For the robustness test, we also introduce the control 
variables of debt divided by total assets (Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010; Krivogorsky 
and Burton, 2012).   
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Table 1. Variables used in the analysis  
Variable name Variable description Variable type 
Firm Value Variable 
Qadj Sector-adjusted and time-adjusted Tobin’s Q 
ratio calculated as follows:  
𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑄𝑖𝑡 − 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑄𝑆𝐸,𝑡)
∙ √|𝑄𝑖𝑡 − 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑄𝑆𝐸,𝑡|, 𝑖
= 1, . ,440; 𝑡 = 1, . ,5. 
Quantitative, real 
ROA Sector-adjusted and time-adjusted return of 
assets ratio 
Quantitative, real 
Ownership Structure Variables 
FIRST Stake of the largest shareholder [%] Quantitative, real 
SECOND Stake of the shareholder second largest 
shareholder [%] 
Quantitative, real 
FREEFLOAT Free float shares [%] Quantitative, real 
FINCON Stake by control-oriented financial investors 
[%] 
Quantitative, real 
FINPOR Stake by portfolio-oriented financial investors 
[%] 
Quantitative, real 
Firm-level Control Variables 
ASSETS Company assets [value million USD] Quantitative, real 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization [value million USD] 
Quantitative, real 
BUSGROUP Information whether the firm functions as the 




Robustness Test Variables 
DEBT Debt [value million USD] Quantitative, real 
DEBT/ASSETS Debt versus assets  Quantitative, real 
Source: Author’s own creation. 
 
3.3 Econometric Models  
 
We construct econometric models for panel data adopting the following strategy. 
Firstly, we note the possibility of discrepancy of variables that characterize sample 
companies concerning the year of observations and the dynamics over time. This 
suggests the requirement to consider the estimation of parameters in the two-way 
effects model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). We reject this approach since Tobin's Q 
values corrected overall analyzed years reveal the statistical insignificance of binary 
variables that measure Q values' time effect. The need to include the personal effects 
into the model was supported with the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test. 
Hausman test indicates that the fixed effects model should be adopted as the adequate 
approach in our analysis. We also run a modified Wald test for group-wise 
heteroscedasticity, which indicated the heteroscedasticity of variance of error terms 
and suggested adopting the robust estimation method.  In the final stage, we estimate 
the parameter for the fixed effects models. The explanatory variables are selected to 
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provide for the interpretation possibilities and keep the errors of parameters 
estimation at the accepted levels.  
 
In our study, we approach the problem of regressor endogeneity. The variable 
ln(ASSETS) is the measure most prone to cause endogeneity effects. We use the one-
year lag value of this variable and estimate two competitive models – the base model 
using the least square methods with fixed effects and the model with the instrument-
variable using the instrumental variables method with fixed effect. The Hausman test 
showed that using the instrumental variables method for the ln (ASSETS) variable is 
redundant. We use the version of the Hausman test dedicated to estimating errors 
resistant to the parameters of structural econometric models (Kaiser, 2014). To test 
the stability of parameters in the base model, we employ the mixed-effects method. 
This allows estimating the following linear model regarding the parameters but not 
to the variables: 
 
𝑄𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑓1(𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑓2(𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑓3(𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽4𝑓4(𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5𝑓5(𝐵𝑈𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6𝑓6(𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡) +
+𝛽7𝑓7(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽8𝑓8(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
            (1) 
 
where i = 1, 2, …, 440 and t = 1, 2, …, 5; 𝑓1, … , 𝑓8 – regressors function,  𝛽1, … , 𝛽8, 𝛼 
– regression coefficients; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 – error component. When the functions  𝑓1, … , 𝑓8 are 
linear our proposed model remains linear regarding the parameters and the variables. 
Calculations are run in STATA15 software.  
 
4. Results and Discussion  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for main variables used in the econometric 
models. The number of observations for analyzed variables is different. We did not 
impute missing observations in the course of the econometric modeling. As shown in 
Table 2, ln(FIRST) for the first largest shareholders is estimated at 35% over the 
analyzed period. Financial investors are not engaged in the ownership structure of 
each of the sample companies – considering only for firms with the investment by 
institutions, the control-oriented financial investors hold on average 36.8% of shares. 
In contrast, the combined engagement of portfolio-oriented financial investors is 
estimated at 18.1%.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of regressands and regressors 
Variables N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Firm Value Variable 
Qadj 1945 0.139 0.658 -0.774 2.809 0.833 3.327 
ROA 1945 -0.025 0.311 -2.811 0.780 -1.763 12.140 
Ownership Structure Regressors 
ln(FIRST) 1946 3.535 0.619 0 4.605 -0.751 3.962 
ln(FREEFLOAT) 1936 2.871 0.911 0 4.605 -0.736 3.537 
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FINCON 1965 36.836 25.275 0 100.00 0.086 2.249 
FINPOR 1965 18.074 17.679 0 99.00 1.283 4.665 
Firm-level Control Regressors 
ln(ASSETS) 1943 4.509 1.999 -2.847 11.159 0.657 3.970 
ln(EBITDA) 1944 1.959 1.559 0 8.036 1.138 4.465 
ln(SECOND) 1875 2.390 0.680 0 3.871 -0.821 4.341 
BUSGROUP 1957 0.886 0.318 0 1 -2.430 6.904 
Robustness Test Regressors 
ln(DEBT) 1943 2.743 2.056 0 9.415 0.646 3.043 
DEBT/ASSETS 1943 0.313 2.049 0 89.138 41.976 1817.174 
Source: Author’s own creation. 
 
Table 3. Correlation coefficients of regressands and regressors 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] 
Qadj[1] 1.00             
ROA[2] 0.40 1.00            
ln(FIRST) [3] 0.01 0.10 1.00           
ln(SECOND) [4] 0.08 0.08 -0.15 1.00          
ln(FREEFLOAT) [5] -0.17 -0.25 -0.44 -0.22 1.00         
BUSGROUP [6] -0.14 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 1.00        
FINCON [7] -0.01 0.06 0.65 -0.27 -0.42 -0.04 1.00       
FINPOR[8] 0.07 0.19 -0.20 0.07 -0.23 0.11 -0.25 1.00      
ln(ASSETS) [9] -0.25 0.11 0.21 -0.25 -0.23 0.24 0.21 0.28 1.00     
ln(EBITDA) [10] 0.07 0.22 0.10 -0.15 -0.17 0.15 0.08 0.29 0.61 1.00    
ln(DEBT) [11] -0.34 -0.04 0.20 -0.23 -0.17 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.86 0.51 1.00   
DEBT/ASSETS [12] 0.06 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 -0.04 0.00 1.00  
Source: Author’s own creation.  
 
Table 3 presents the value of Pearson correlation coefficients. We test whether 
correction may cause the inflation of variation in the process of estimation of fixed-
effect models. We find no support for the inflation issue, both concerning the 
characteristics of fixed effects and the estimation of models with errors resistant to 
the estimation of structural parameters. 
 
Values of skewness and kurtosis indicate that none of the continuous regressors and 
regressand follows the normal distribution. Based on the results of the Shapiro-Wilk 
test (null hypothesis is the normal distribution of variable), we reject the hypothesis 
of the normal distribution of the regressors. In addition, we test the stationarity of 
regressors in the panel data using the Fisher unit-root test for unbalanced panel data 
(null hypothesis is variable has unit root). In all cases, the null hypothesis is firmly 
rejected. All variables do not have a normal distribution and reveal stationary 
distribution over the analyzed period (reported in supplementary materials).  
 
For each analyzed year, the distribution of Tobin’s Q value shows considerable 
positive skewness. This means that companies revealing lower Tobin’s Q are to be 
more frequently found in our sample than companies with higher Tobin’s Q. 
Distributions of Tobin’s Q in 2010-2012 are bimodal, while in 2013-2014, they reveal 
single mode. The median Q is a more appropriate measure than the mean value in 
variable distributions significantly diverging from the symmetric and multimodal 
distribution.  The values of Tobin’s Q vary over time and analyzed companies. Data 
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variability is more significant for individual companies than for years in the analyzed 
period.  
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression model. All structural parameters are 
estimated with accepted accuracy. The total change of regressors explains over 15.6% 
changes of Tobin’s Q, group-wise and timewise.  
 
Table 4. Estimation results for dependent variable Qadj  






























































































N (observations) 1943 1844 1836 1836 1836 1769 
n (companies) 434 426 424 424 424 412 






















FProb > F 30.05 18.33 15.80 14.09 12.88 12.39 
Shapiro-Wilk z 


























Note: The robust standard error for each coefficient is reported in parentheses. Symbol *** 
means p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, where p-value is called observed level of 
significance. Significance test for coefficients is test z-statistics, z: N (0,1).  
Source: Author’s own creation. 
 
As reported in Table 4, ownership concentration and free float are negatively 
correlated with Q. Ownership by control-oriented as well as portfolio-oriented 
financial investors is positively linked with Q. 
 
We use the unbalanced panel in models A1, A2, and A3, A4, and A5. Model A6 is 
based on the same regressors used in model A5, but the parameters are estimated for 
companies excluding firms with the stake by the government.  We run Hausman tests 
– we confront all fixed effects models A1-A6 with the respective random effect 
models. In each test null hypothesis on random effect, the model is rejected. Results 




of the Shapiro-Wilk test reveal that for each A1-A6 model null hypothesis on the 
normal distribution of error components is firmly rejected. Thus, for many 
observations, we interpret values of robust standard errors as the value of distribution 
N(0,1). 
 
Structural parameters for all regressors in all presented models are statistically 
different from 0. Consequently, the F test shows that the change of regressors value 
in A1-A6 models is statistically significant for Qadj value changes. We neither find 
collinearity of regressors nor identify collinearity issues for any of the A1-A6 models. 
The increase of mean VIF value in A4-A6 models does not significantly increase 
parameter estimation error. The value of determination coefficients reveals that the 
variability between is better than the variability within Qadj values for each model. 
The variability of used regressors explains about 12.3% in the A1 model and 16.7% 
in the A6 model of the regressand variability. In the presentation of the research 
results, we omit the results of other A5 model estimations, representing the variability 
of Tobin’s Q over the years in the analyzed period, with 2010 as the reference year. 
All estimated parameters of the variables are harmful with approximately -0.028, -
0.024, -0.033, -0.024 for subsequent years of the analyzed period and are not 
statistically significantly calculated separately and combined.  
 
In addition, we address the possibility of an endogeneity problem in our models. We 
identify ln(ASSETS) regressor as the potential source of endogeneity based on the 
correlation coefficients. We verify this hypothesis as follows. We estimate fixed-
effects models with the same set of regressors using two approaches, the least-squares 
method (LS) and instrumental variables (IV). In the latter model, we use the one-year 
lag value of ln(ASSETS) as the instrument.  We estimate both models for 2011-2014 
to assure full comparability. We use the Hausman test confronting the LS model (null 
hypothesis) with the IV model. The rejection of the null hypothesis would suggest 
choosing the IV model and indicate that the ln(ASSETS) variable may cause 
endogeneity problems. No reason to reject the null hypothesis means that we should 




We also perform robustness checks (Lu and White, 2014) to test to what extent the 
results are robust to alternative measures. We run robustness tests with respect to 
different control variables which are ln (DEBT) and DEBT/ASSETS instead of 
ln(ASSETS) and ln(EBITDA) as reported in Table 5.  
  
Table 5. Estimation results for explained variable Qadj – robustness test 
Regressors Model B1 Model B2 
ln(FIRST) -0.2610 (0.0883) *** -0.2850 (0.0889) *** 
ln(FREEFLOAT) -0.0756 (0.0208) *** -0.0794 (0.0214). *** 
FINCON 0.0053 (0.0025). ** 0.0060 (0.0026) ** 
FINPORT 0.0015 (0.0016) 0.0014 (0.0016) 
ln(SECOND) 0.0479 (0.0260) * 0.0635 (0.0277) ** 
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ln(DEBT) -0.1478 (0.0214). ***  
DEBT/ASSETS  0.0202 (0.0007) *** 
BUSGROUP -0.2604 (0.1007) *** -0.2635 (0.1164) ** 
intercept 1.5938 (0.2572). *** 1.2176 (0.2596). *** 
N (observations) 1836 1836 
n (companies) 424 424 




























Note: The robust standard error for each coefficient is reported in parentheses. Symbol *** 
means p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, where p-value is called observed level of 
significance. Significance test for coefficients is test z-statistics, z: N (0,1).  
Source: Author’s own creation. 
 
As presented in Table 5, with the use of alternative control variables majority of our 
results hold for findings from the base model. The check confirms that ownership 
concentration and free float remain negatively correlated with Q, while ownership by 
control-oriented financial investors is positively linked with Q. The change of two 
control variables has an impact on evidence assumed in hypothesis 3b. The results 
show that investment by portfolio-oriented financial investors is statistically 




Adding to the scant evidence on Central and Eastern Europe (Gugler et al., 2014), we 
explore the effect of dispersed ownership, analyzing the links between free float and 
firm value. In our model-free float reveals the adverse effects on Tobin’s Q. These 
findings support hypothesis H1 showing that dispersed ownership, despite many 
benefits for risk diversification and raising substantial funds, exerts significant 
limitations. Shortcomings referred in the prior studies to problems of coordinating 
actions of fragmented shareholders to monitor executive, opportunistic behavior of 
managers, and information asymmetry constitute the core of principal-agent conflicts 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Aguiliera and Crespi-
Cladera, 2016).  
 
We offer new evidence on ownership structures in post-transition economies and add 
to prior studies which emphasize the limitations of block holder ownership (Berglöf 
and Claessens, 2006; Hardi and Buti, 2012). Specifically, we note that ownership 
concentration measured by the stake held by the largest shareholder is negatively 
associated with a firm value that supports hypothesis H2. Our results are consistent 




with the assumption of detrimental role by large shareholders (de Miguel et al., 2004). 
Majority shareholders are likely to engage in exerting personal benefits to reduce 
agency cost and, consequently, to destroy firm value at the cost of minority 
shareholders (Maug, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
We challenge the monitoring effect of financial investors distinguishing two of their 
types: control-oriented financial investor and portfolio-oriented financial investors 
adding to the ongoing debate of the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance (Chen et al., 2007; Hsu and Wang, 2014; Nagel et al., 2015; Mehrani et 
al., 2017). We observe the positive and statistically significant effect for the 
ownership by control-oriented financial investors. This means that we find support 
for hypothesis H3a and argue that control-oriented financial investors are likely to 
use their investment position to exert effective control, dominate discipline owners, 
and enhance firm value (Rose, 2007; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Krivogorsky and 
Burton, 2012). In hypothesis 3b, we assume no significant relation between 
ownership by portfolio-oriented financial investors and company value remains 
statistically insignificant. Our results partially support this notion – employing a 
different set of the control variable, we note the lack of correlation between ownership 
by portfolio-oriented financial investors and company value. We attribute this finding 
to efficient monitoring by portfolio-oriented financial investors who, despite 




Ownership concentration allows block holder to maintain control (Perkins et al., 
2014; Iwasaki and Mizobata, 2020) remains one of the most common features of 
companies in emerging markets and post-transition countries (Berglöf and Claessens, 
2006; Hardi and Butti, 2012). Despite numerous studies, the consequences of 
ownership structure in the context of highly concentrated ownership, insufficient 
investor protection, and costly access to external financing require further analysis. 
 
Our article presents evidence that simple ownership concentration decreases firm 
value, so does dispersed ownership. We distinguish two types of financial investors 
in shareholder structure and show that the presence of control-oriented financial 
investors is positively correlated with Q, as is ownership by portfolio-oriented 
institutions. We argue that regardless of the size of their investment, both 
distinguished types of financial investors reveal the potential for effective 
governance, particularly offsetting the adverse effects of dispersed and concentrated 
ownership. This finding adds to the ongoing debate on the role of institutional 
ownership in corporate governance (Hsu and Wang, 2014; Mehrani et al., 2017).  
 
Our study reveals some limitations. We focused on Polish companies to test the link 
between ownership structure and firm value. It would be valuable to confront the 
Polish case with other post-transition countries and emerging markets to assess 
whether these findings would work in a similar context. Also, increasing the period 
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of analysis and using additional ownership variables and measures of financial 
performance could help understand whether this observation would hold over time.  
 
This article has important implications for academics, practitioners, and 
policymakers. For academics, it adds to the discussion on corporate governance in 
the emerging market, raising the benefits and costs of dispersed and concentrated 
ownership. For practitioners and policymakers, we indicate the positive effect of the 
monitoring by financial investors, which can offset some limitations of insufficient 
investor protection in emerging markets. Their positive role remains crucial in 
companies characterized by highly concentrated ownership. The adequate regulation 
in place may support governance by such investors what may add to the standards of 
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